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HE DECADE which began in 1960 with John F. Kennedy's pledge
to conquer the moon also saw the beginnings of a monumental
national effort to master our earthly environment. Scholars,
lawmakers and laymen alike realized that environmental degradation
had become a clear and present danger to our health and welfare;
that technologies to control or abate offensive discharges would have
to be developed at once; and that an effective legal foundation upon
which to build, implement and enforce the needed controls would have
to be adopted. The urgency and determination with which some states
approached this task paralleled the moon crash-program, and Illinois
was unquestionably in the forefront in the battle to conquer environ-
mental pollution.
This article will examine several key provisions of the Illinois
Environmental Protection Act of 1970,' some fundamental principles
and precedents established by the Illinois Pollution Control Board,
and the major problem areas which have confronted that agency in
its formative years.
II. THE HISTORY
Prior to July of 1970, Illinois' program to protect its environment
was haphazard at best. There was a pollution control division within
the Illinois Department of Public Health, and there were separate
administrative boards with jurisdiction over air and water pollution
respectively. These boards were composed essentially of part-time
*Administrative Assistant to the Board Chairman, Illinois Pollution Control
Board, 1970-1973. Founder and Director, Environmental Lawyers Clinic. B.A.,
L.L.B., New York University.
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111%, § 1001 et seq. (1970).
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unpaid volunteers, chosen largely to represent specific interest groups.
Their staffs were generally under-budgeted. In enforcement cases,
the board members sat as judges and their own staffs acted as pros-
ecutors presenting the case to them for decision. Under this legis-
lative scheme,2 neither board could invoke any truly effective sanc-
tion. The agencies had no power to assess penalties against pol-
luters because the enabling legislation had neglected to give them the
teeth necessary to put some bite into their regulations.
To add to the confusion, separate and distinct programs were
established to deal with solid waste disposal, radiation and the pro-
tection of public water supplies. No program whatsoever existed to
cope with noise pollution. Finally, both the city of Chicago and
the Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago were exempted
from compliance with state air and water pollution regulations. 3
Many of these clear deficiencies were at least partially remedied
by the Illinois Environmental Protection Act of 1970 (the "Act"),
culminating what President Nixon's Council on Environmental Qual-
ity characterized as "the most innovative State reorganization pro-
gram" in the nation in the area of environmental protection. 5  The
Act completely overhauled the state's machinery for combatting pol-
lution by establishing three new and powerful administrative agen-
cies, each with authority over the entire field of pollution control
(air, water, solid waste, noise, radiation, thermal, public water sup-
plies, etc.) and each with jurisdiction throughout Illinois. The three
agencies are the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), the
Pollution Control Board ("Board") and the Institute for Environ-
mental Quality ("IEQ"). While all three agencies were created as
independent entities, they must, by both necessity and design, rely to
a certain extent on the expertise developed in and by the other agen-
cies. Therefore, they are intimately interrelated in some respects
while remaining totally separate and apart in others.
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111/, § 240.1 et seq. (1963); ch. 19, § 145.1 et seq.
(1951).
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111Y2, § 240.14 (1963); ch. 19, § 145.17 (1951).
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 , § 1001 etseq. (1970).
5. THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 52 (August, 1971).
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III. THE AGENCIES
The Environmental Protection Agency was created within the
executive branch of the state government and performs the duties of
the previous Department of Health divisions of sanitary engineering
and laboratories. 6 The EPA is charged with the duty of investigating
and identifying pollution sources and conditions; preparing, filing
and prosecuting pollution enforcement cases before the Board; and
making and supporting proposals for new or modified discharge reg-
ulations.' When the three agencies first came into existence during
the summer of 1970, the EPA had its own legal staff of six to ten
lawyers who, working closely with their own field investigators, sci-
entists, and technicians, both prepared and personally prosecuted the
cases before the Board. This enabled the EPA's own "in-house"
personnel to develop and pursue a case from beginning to end,
swiftly and effectively. Policy decisions were simplified: the EPA
determined which cases it would investigate based upon information
provided by its own staff; EPA attorneys filed and prosecuted the
cases before the Pollution Control Board as a party complainant;
and the program functioned pretty much as it was intended to func-
tion.
In addition to its primary duties, the EPA monitors air and water
quality, noise and land pollution, and identifies and investigates sources
of pollution. It trains operators of solid waste disposal sites and
municipal sewage treatment plants; it serves as the conduit through
which federal funds are dispensed to local communities to construct
or improve treatment facilities, declares pollution "episodes" when
emergency conditions exist, and has the authority to seal pollution
sources.
8
The Pollution Control Board is a quasi-judicial administrative
adjudicative agency composed of five full-time, "technically-quali-
fied" members appointed by the Governor with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate. 9 The Board, which incorporates the pre-existing
part-time air and water pollution boards, has two principal functions:
it acts as a judge in deciding pollution enforcement cases brought by
6. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111'/, § 1004(a) (1970).
7. ILL. REV." STAT. ch. 111Y2, § 1004(a)-(j) (1970).
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 , § 1034(a)-(d) (1970).
9. ILL. REV. STAT. cl. 1111/2, § 1005(a) (1970).
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the EPA or by private parties, and in variance petitions brought by
polluters; and it adopts statewide discharge regulations or pollution
standards. 10 The Board appoints hearing officers to conduct most
of its enforcement and variance cases, and decides the cases based
strictly upon its review of the written record and transcript of the
proceedings. Hearing officers play no role whatsoever in the deci-
sion-making process since they are not "technically-qualified," not
subject to the careful appointment process which determines the se-
lection of board members, and not fully aware of the body of prece-
dents established by the Board in all its former decisions. They do,
however, rule on the admissibility of evidence, credibility of witnesses,
and conduct of the hearings. Hearing officers are chosen strictly on
the basis of merit, without regard to political considerations and are
paid $100.00 per day plus expenses to perform their duties. They
are guided in their tasks by the Board's procedural rules" and by
a packet of guidelines developed by the Board's legal personnel to
assist officers in specific areas. 2
In enforcing its regulations or adjudicative decisions, the Board
has been granted extensive quasi-judicial powers. Under section
1033(b) of the Act, the Board can impose affirmative action condi-
tions upon violators (such as a requirement to install a pollution con-
trol device), order individual pollution sources shut down, and impose
penalties for violations, including substantial monetary penalties." A
recent appellate court decision' 4 has sustained the constitutionality of
the imposition of monetary penalties by the Board in enforcement
cases, holding that this does not constitute an improper delegation of
judicial power to an administrative agency.' 5
Although the Board is given broad authority to adjudicate pollu-
10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, § 1005(b)-(e) (1970).
11. State of Illinois Pollution Control Board Regulations, ch. 1 (Procedural
Rules), adopted (October 8, 1970).
12. State of Illinois Pollution Control Board, HEARING OFFICER PACKET (1970).
13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIlY2, §§ 1033(a)-(i), 1042 (1970).
14. C. M. Ford v. Environmental Protection Agency, 9 Ill. App. 3d 711, 292
N.E.2d 540 (1973).
15. But cf. Citizens Utilities Co. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 9 Il.
App. 3d 158, 289 N.E.2d 642 (1972), holding that the Illinois Environmental
Protection Act did not confer upon the Pollution Control Board' the authority to
impose monetary penalties as conditions affixed to the grant of a variance from
pollution laws, rules or regulations.
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tion cases, it is not the final arbiter. Title XI of the Act provides:
[A]ny party adversely affected by a final order or determination of the Board may
obtain judicial review ...within thirty-five days after entry of the order or other
final action complained of, pursuant to the provisions of the "Administrative Review
Act," . . . except that review shall be afforded directly in the Appellate Court for
the District in which the cause of action arose and not in the Circuit Court. 16
The inclusion of the direct review provision in the Act vitiated the
necessity of having to retry the entire pollution case on appeal and
represented tacit admission of the desirability of accelerating the
process of judicial review in this type of case.
One of the most unique and attractive highlights of the Act is its
emphasis on public openness, involvement and participation. All
meetings of the Board are required to be open to the public 1'7 and all
files, records, and data of the EPA, the Board and the IEQ must be
made available to reasonable public inspection.' 8 In the regulatory
area, the Act provides that any individual or group may present
written proposals for amendment or repeal of any of the Board's
regulations, or for adoption of new regulations, and adds:
If the Board finds that any such proposal is supported by an adequate statement of
reasons, is accompanied by a petition signed by at least 200 persons, is not plainly
devoid of merit and does not deal with a subject on which a hearing has been
held within the preceding 6 months, the Board shall schedule a public hearing for
consideration of the proposal. 1 9
Section 1031(b) of the Act establishes the innovative concept of
the citizen suit.20 Under this section, any citizen may file, with the
Board, a complaint against any other person allegedly violating the
Act or any rule or regulation adopted thereunder, and unless the
Board determines that the complaint is either frivolous or duplicative,
a hearing on the charge must be held. The clear value of such a
system is that it serves as a safeguard against governmental inaction
attributable to either budget limitations or the political considerations
of an elected prosecutor.
Finally, section 1032 of the Act provides that all enforcement
hearings (prosecutions) shall be open to the public, and that "any
person may submit written statements to the Board in connection
16. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 , § 1041 (1970).
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 , § 1005(a) (1970).
18. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/, § 1007(a) (1970).
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 , § 1028 (1970) (emphasis added).
20. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111%, § 1031(b) (1970).
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with the subject thereof. In addition, the Board may permit any
person to offer oral testimony. 21
During its first three years of operations, the Board has found that
the public participation provisions of the Act have had the salutary
effects of spreading concern for pollution problems, and disseminat-
ing information on environmental questions. Occasionally, the EPA
has taken over the prosecution of a suit originally instituted by pri-
vate parties.
The Institute for Environmental Quality is an entirely new
agency designed to conduct research into specific areas of environ-
mental concern; to perform environmental resource planning; to
store and retrieve environmental data; and to act as a technical staff
for the Board, the EPA and other agencies.22 In defining the scope
of the IEQ's duties, the legislature specifically provided:
It is not the intent of this Act that the Institute should engage in abstract scientific
research nor generally undertake the investigation of particular cases for presentation
before the Board, except where long-range goals may dictate a special need.
2 3
The adoption of the Environmental Protection Act sketched the
legal framework within which environmental law in Illinois would
have to be made. On this foundation, the Board constructed many
significant substantive and procedural precedents in nearly 700 cases
decided during its first three years of operations. It is essential for
the attorney practicing environmental law in Illinois to have, at a
minimum, a basic familiarity with the principles established by the
Board in several key cases.
IV. THE PRECEDENTS
A. REGULATORY
1. Housecleaning: The Board began its operations, during the
summer of 1970, armed with a body of rules and regulations adopted
by its predecessor agencies. Section 1049(c) of the Act continued
these rules in effect until repealed, amended or superseded by new
measures adopted by the Board.24 The Board's first priority, there-
fore, was to begin housecleaning operations with a view toward elim-
21. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1111/2, § 1032 (1970).
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 , § 1006 (1970).
23. Id.
24. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111%, § 1049(c) (1970).
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inating some of the unnecessary regulations, updating and strengthen-
ing others, and filling in the gaps which previously had existed in
the state's anti-pollution program. Accordingly, regulations were
adopted during the first few months requiring the removal of phos-
phates from wastes discharged into Lake Michigan;25 setting strict
mercury discharge standards;2" substantially revising the rules appli-
cable to air pollution emergency episode situations;27 and accelerat-
ing the dates by which secondary treatment of sewage would be
required for sources located on the Mississippi River.28
2. Water Pollution: In the field of water pollution control, the
Board has established a comprehensive, two-pronged regulatory pro-
gram. The water quality standards are designed to protect entire
streams and bodies of water,29 and the effluent standards cover a
wide range of chemical constituents and are designed to force dis-
chargers to capture harmful contaminants at the point of discharge. 30
These two sets of standards form the heart of Illinois' program to
combat water pollution. Underlying this regulatory scheme is the
concept that all dischargers should employ a minimum level of treat-
ment sufficient to prevent pollution, while at the same time allowing
for anticipated growth in industrial and municipal sources as well as
in population. The scheme also recognizes that sources located in
certain highly congested areas of the state will require stricter con-
trols so that the water quality standards applicable to the receiving
stream will not be exceeded. The yardstick applied by the Board in
determining whether or not to adopt specific regulations pertaining
to water pollution (or to any other area of the Board's regulatory
authority) is, among other things, the "technical feasibility and eco-
25. State of Illinois Pollution Control Board Regulations, ch. 3 (Water Pollu-
tion-Phosphorous Standards), adopted as R70-6 (January 6, 1971).
26. State of Illinois Pollution Control Board Regulations, ch. 3 (Water Pollution-
Mercury Standards), adopted as R70-5 (March 31, 1971).
27. State of Illinois Pollution Control Board Regulations, ch. 2, part IV (Air
Pollution-Episodes), adopted as R70-7 (December 9, 1970).
28. State of Illinois Pollution Control Board Regulations, ch. 3 (Water Pollution-
Water Quality Standards for the Mississippi River), adopted as R70-3 (January 6,
1971).
29. State of Illinois Pollution Control Board Regulations, ch. 3, part II (Water
Pollution-Water Quality Standards), adopted as R71-14 (January 6, 1972).
30. State of Illinois Pollution Control Board Regulations, ch. 3, part IV (Water
Pollution-Effluent Standards), adopted as R70-8 (January 6, 1972).
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nomic reasonableness of . . . reducing the particular type of pollu-
tion"'" under consideration.
The combined effluent and water quality standards cover all dis-
charges to Illinois waterways and, for the first time in Illinois history,
provide a uniform, comprehensive and coherent statewide water pol-
lution control plan. The regulations pertain to both hazardous sub-
stances (such as arsenic, cyanide, cadmium, fluoride, lead, zinc and
mercury) and nuisance substances (such as oils and phenols). As
a result, Illinois is one of the first states to have adopted such a
comprehensive and progressive program to protect its waters.
3. Air Pollution: After numerous public hearings, the Board
adopted extensive air pollution regulations designed to achieve and
implement federal ambient air quality standards. 32 The regulations
greatly strengthened existing standards governing the emission of
particulate matter (essentially smoke and dust). They also estab-
lished standards for the first time limiting the emissions of sulfur
dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides and hydrocarbons (or-
ganic materials) from stationary sources. Combined with regula-
tions adopted by the Board governing open burning, 38 and with anti-
cipated federal controls on motor vehicle emissions, Illinois should by
1975 be able to attain the levels of minimum air quality acceptability
set by the federal government.
The Board had also proposed a regulation which would have had
the effect of banning the residential and commercial use of coal in
small uncontrolled burners within the city of Chicago by mid-1975.
The Board reasoned that this was the only way in which minimum
federal air quality standards could be met, by that time, in the Chicago
metropolitan area. But a Cook County Circuit Court judge enjoined
the Board from adopting the measure. 4 In view of the restriction
placed upon the state, the federal Environmental Protection Agency
31. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111/2, § 1027 (1970).
32. State of Illinois Pollution Control Board Regulations, ch. 2, part II (Air
Pollution-Emission Standards and Limitations for Stationary Sources), adopted as
R71-23 (April 13, 1972).
33. State of Illinois Pollution Control Board Regulations, ch. 2, part V (Air
Pollution-Open Burning), adopted as R70-11 (September 2, 1971); as amended R72-
11 (November 8, 1972).
34. Roth-Adam Fuel Co. v. Pollution Control Board, 72 CH 1484 (Cir.
Ct. County of Cook) (1972); the Board appealed the circuit court's order and the
appellate court reversed and set aside the injunction. 10 11. App. 3d 756, 295 N.E.2d
321 (1973).
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has made clear its intention of adopting a regulation for the Chicago-
area which would have the same effect.3 5
4. Other Matters: Other significant measures adopted by the PCB
have included regulations governing the use and application of
asbestos and asbestos products in Illinois,36 and regulations designed
to control air and water pollution at mine sites.37
The Board has also considered various other regulatory proposals
but has determined that additional study and substantiation is neces-
sary before they can be adopted. For example, regulations dealing
with fertilizer application to farmlands and the resultant water pollu-
tion caused by land runoff were referred to the IEQ for further
study;38 a proposal to ban phosphates in all detergents throughout
Illinois was rejected;39 a proposal to limit the emission of noise from
toys sold in Illinois was rejected;40 and a detailed plan to control
pollution from animal feedlots and milking operations was tabled."'
In addition, the Board has pending before it regulations designed
to control noise emissions from stationary sources,42 pollution at
landfill and solid waste disposal sites,4 ' and litter attributable to
beverage containers.44 Furthermore, pending legislation would effec-
tuate the regionalization of sewage treatment facilities. 5
B. ADJUDICATIVE
The Board has established significant substantive and procedural
precedents in its first few years of operations. As a newly created
35. 40 C.F.R. § 52.726 (July 27, 1972) (Regulations proposed by Federal En-
vironmental Protection Agency).
36. State of Illinois Pollution Control Board Regulations, ch. 2, part VI (Air
Pollution-Asbestos and Spray Insulation and Fireproofing), adopted as R71-16
(January 6, 1972).
37. State of Illinois Pollution Control Board Regulations, ch. 4, part I-VII (Mine
Wastes), adopted as R71-25 (May 23, 1972).
38. In the matter of Plant Nutrients, R71-15 (March 28, 1972).
39. Phosphate Ban in Detergents, R71-10 (March 14, 1972).
40. In the Matter of Citizens Against Noise, Toy Noise Proposal, R72-16 (Oc-
tober 31, 1972).
41. Animal Waste Regulations, Feedlots, R72-9 (February, 1973).
42. Proposed Noise Regulations for Stationary Sources, R72-2.
43. Proposed Landfill and Solid Waste Disposal Regulations, R72-5.
44. Proposed Beverage Container Regulations, R71-24.
45. Proposed Sewage Treatment Plant Regionalization Regulations, R70-17.
1973] 767
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
quasi-judicial entity, it has been able to establish its own rules of
procedure and then to create a body of supporting case law and prec-
edents in an area in which none had existed before. The sweeping
powers given to the Board under the Environmental Protection Act
have enabled it to exercise quasi-legislative rule-making authority,
and then to be able to enforce its own regulations through the exer-
cise of quasi-judicial enforcement authority.
But, consistent with the policy of the Act to separate the functions
of the three new environmental state agencies, the Board may not
initiate or prosecute enforcement actions before itself, but may only
adjudicate when cases are brought before it by the EPA, some other
state or local agency, or a private citizen. 6  This is entirely as it
should be, since combining the rule-making, prosecutorial and adju-
dicative functions into one agency might work a basic unfairness on
those accused of pollution violations.
The Board has consistently held that the Act expressly created a
unified statewide program, thereby abolishing all pre-existing local
exemptions.17  As such, the city of Chicago and the Metropolitan
Sanitary District of Greater Chicago are now subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the state in the field of environmental control, and, therefore,
must comply with the state's permit programs and may be penalized
for failure to comply with state regulations. 8 In addition, the Board
has rejected the argument that the city of Chicago, as a home rule
unit under the new Illinois Constitution is immune from Board juris-
diction, pointing out that while the constitution intended to confer
governmental authority on local governments, it did not intend to
limit state authority or to exempt local governments from complying
with state law.49
In a case brought by a citizen environmental group,5° the Board
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, § 1031(a)-(c) (1970).
47. In the matter of Exemptions for Sanitary Districts and Exemptions for
Political Subdivisions, R70-1 (October 8, 1970); American Generator and Armature
Co. v. EPA, # 71-329, 3 PCB 373 (January 6, 1972).
48. Metropolitan Sanitary District v. EPA, # 72-111, 135, 4 PCB 737 (June 29,
1972); EPA v. James McHugh Construction Co., # 71-291, 4 PCB 511 (May 17,
1972).
49. EPA v. James McHugh Construction Co., # 71-291, 4 PCB 511 (May 17,
1972).
50. Y.E.S. v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., # 71-254, 4 PCB 697 (June 27,
1972).
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established an important precedent relating to the measure of proof
to be applied in pollution enforcement cases. The Board held that,
since the Act simply makes it illegal to "cause or allow" pollution,
or to exceed standards set in the Board regulations, there is no need
to make an affirmative showing of "negligence" in order to prove a
violation. Nevertheless, the Board has indicated that mitigating evi-
dence relating to the arbitrary or unreasonable hardship to which an
individual petitioner or respondent would be subject if compliance
were required, as well as the technical feasibility or economic reason-
ableness of meeting particular standards, would be appropriate and
admissible. 5' But the Board has also held that in order to be en-
titled to a variance, a petitioner must show not only that compliance
would impose an arbitrary or unreasonable hardship, but also that
non-compliance would not have an unacceptably detrimental effect
on the neighboring community.52
In dealing with sister state agencies, the Board has applied the
same principles noted in the cases involving local governmental en-
tities; namely, that the Act was intended to apply with equal vigor to
all, without exception, and that most significantly, "the State should
ensure that its own hands are clean before penalizing others for soil-
ing the environment. '5 3 Several decisions have set forth the princi-
ple that a governmental entity which takes upon itself the function
of conducting sewage or wastes through a system it both operates
and controls, also assumes the duty of policing that system to assure
that harmful contaminants are not even accidently discharged into it,
regardless of who is the discharger. 4
Indicative of the vast power exercised by the Board, substantial
money penalties have been imposed against violators,55 and major
commercial operations have been shut down pending installation of
control equipment, all as part of the Board's efforts to cope with
51. Id.
52. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. EPA, # 70-41, 1 PCB 281 (March 3, 1971).
53. EPA v. City of Champaign, # 71-51C, 2 PCB 411, 415 (September 16,
1971).
54. EPA v. City of Urbana, # 71-365, 5 PCB 331 (September 6, 1972); EPA
v. Airtex Products, Inc., # 71-325, 3 PCB 591 (February 3, 1972); EPA v. City of
Champaign, # 71-51C, 2 PCB 411 (September 16, 1971).
55. GAF Corp. v. EPA, # 71-11, 5 PCB 525 (October 3, 1972); EPA v. Russell,
Burdsall, & Ward Bolt & Nut Co., # 71-369, 4 PCB 701 (June 27, 1972).
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Illinois' growing pollution problem. 6 In one case, involving a
southern Illinois steel company, the respondent was ordered to estab-
lish a $150,000 scholarship fund for environmental education at the
University of Illinois."
Perhaps the most serious and pervasive pollution problem in Illi-
nois involves inadequate sewage treatment facilities, with old and
decaying sewers feeding into plants either presently overloaded or on
the verge of becoming so. In attempting to deal with this problem,
the Board has endorsed and applied the highly controversial interim
remedy of the sewer connection ban: prohibiting, on a temporary
basis, further connections to sewers serving inadequate sewage treat-
ment facilities. Such bans have been applied in several large Illinois
communities such as Danville, 58 Mattoon,59 and throughout the en-
tire North Shore Sanitary District,6" the latter encompassing virtually
all of Lake County and the attractive suburbs near Lake Michigan,
from Chicago north to the Wisconsin line. Application of this rem-
edy has generated a raft of opposition from the construction industry
and from individuals desirous of building homes, since occupancy
permits cannot be obtained if the particular construction is not per-
mitted to hook on to a sanitary sewage system. A recent appellate
court decision upheld the Board's authority to impose such sewer
connection bans."'
The Board has recognized the localized hardship created by impo-
sition of a sewer connection ban, but has weighed into the balance
the potential harm to an affected body of water or natural resource
if the ban is not imposed. In addition, experience has shown that
application of the ban has had the immediate effect of creating a
great deal of local public pressure to improve the sewage treatment
situation, and the corresponding effect of inspiring local officials to
devise progressive and effective clean-up programs which apparently
56. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA, # 71-4, 33, 2 PCB 581 (October 14,
1971); EPA v. Incinerator, Inc., # 71-69, 2 PCB 505 (September 30, 1971).
57. EPA v. Granite City Steel Co., # 70-34, 4 PCB 347 (April 25, 1972).
58. EPA v. Danville Sanitary District, # 71-28, 1 PCB 619 (May 26, 1971).
59. City of Mattoon v. EPA, # 71-8, 1 PCB 441 (April 14, 1971).
60. League of Women Voters v. North Shore Sanitary District, # 70-7, 12,
13, 14, 1 PCB 369 (March 31, 1971).
61. Citizens Utilities Co. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 19 Ill. App.
3d 158, 289 N.E.2d 642 (1972).
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had never occurred to them before. 2 In cases of individual hard-
ship, variances allowing petitioners to connect to an overloaded plant
have often been granted.6"
Application of a sewer connection ban as an interim remedial
measure has proven to be an effective method of dealing with sewage
water pollution. It is not difficult, therefore, to envision expansion
of the concept underlying this remedy to other areas.
Much has been said about an impending power crisis facing the
United States and, indeed, even the world.14  The numerous individ-
ual pollution cases involving power generating facilities have under-
lined the potential harm these stations can do to our environment.05
Given these considerations, and the apparent remoteness of a uni-
fied, nation-wide network of "clean" power sources, the application
of localized power connection bans-prohibitions on connections of
new or expanded sources to individual generating facilities-is a
strong likelihood.
As originally adopted, title VI-A of the Environmental Protection
Act required that permits for the construction and operation of new
nuclear facilities, such as nuclear power or fuel recovery plants, had
to be obtained from the Board.66 The United States Supreme Court
has held, however, that only the Atomic Energy Commission may
regulate in the area of radioactive emissions, 67 and consequently, the
Board has ruled that title VI-A is totally invalid.68
62. Danville Sanitary District v. EPA, # 72-161, 4 PCB 673 (June 14, 1972);
City of Mattoon v. EPA, # 72-64, 4 PCB 653 (June 6, 1972); North Shore Sanitary
District v. EPA, # 71-343, 3 PCB 541 (January 31, 1972).
63. See Patricia Development Corp. v. EPA, # 71-161, 2 PCB 469 (September
16, 1971); Park Manor Nursing Home v. EPA, # 71-190, 2 PCB 369 (September
2, 1971); Tauber v. EPA, # 71-171, 2 PCB 317 (August 13, 1971); Wachta v.
EPA, # 71-77, 2 PCB 117, 190A (Order-July 12, 1971; Opinion-August 5, 1971).
64. See L. ROCKS & R. RUNYON, THE ENERGY CRISIS (1972).
65. See Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. EPA, # 71-261, 262, 263, 264, 3
PCB 689 (March 2, 1973); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. EPA, # 71-129, 2 PCB
627 (October 14, 1971); Illinois Power Co. v. EPA, # 71-193, 195, 196, 197, 198,
2 PCB 547 (September 30, 1971).
66. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1112, title VI-A, § 1025(a) (1970).
67. Northern States Power Co. v. State of Minnesota, 404 U.S. 1056 (1972).
68. Application of Commonwealth Edison Co., # # 70-21, 71-20, 328, 354, 4
PCB 445 (May 3, 1972).
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V. THE PROBLEMS
A. INVOLVEMENT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
In approximately March, 1971, the original tri-agency concept
became diluted when the Office of the Attorney General of Illinois
insisted upon being the representative of the EPA in all pollution
proceedings before the Board. The then Attorney General, William
J. Scott, apparently based his claim on the theory that he was the
attorney for all state agencies and, therefore, the EPA could only
prosecute its cases through his office. In a meeting with former
Governor Ogilvie, Attorney General Scott managed to secure for his
office the right to file, prosecute and presumably publicize the EPA's
cases for it before the Board, while also retaining his "independent"
powers to pursue any given polluter in a court of law.6" The imme-
diate result was the emasculation and demoralization of the EPA
legal staff, and the dilution of both the effectiveness and independ-
ence of the EPA in its judgment and performance. The long-term
result has, for the most part, been the insufficient and inadequate
prosecution of pollution cases for the EPA.
Cases are now investigated and prepared by the EPA's field staff,
and then turned over to the Attorney General's office. It is the
Attorney General who decides whether a case should or should not
be filed, be given high priority or low, settled or contested. The
time lapse between investigation, preparation, and prosecution has
become excessive,7" and cases which the EPA feel should be filed
languish in the Attorney General's office. Most unfortunately, po-
litical and public relations considerations have been added to the
state's environmental protection program, which had in the past been
hailed as a model of objectivity and effectiveness. These problems
may be inherent whenever prosecution is in the hands of an elected
public official.
69. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 14, § 12 (1969).
70. The first variance ever automatically granted by the Board because the statu-
tory 90-day limit for variance decisions had been exceeded occurred in Kelberger v.
EPA, # 72-177, 5 PCB 477 (September 26, 1972). The Board said it could not
"fathom" how the EPA and the Attorney General's Office had managed to take
over 100 days to prepare and file a two-page recommendation, especially in view
of the fact that the recommendation contained nothing more than a recitation of
the allegations in the petition and a one-paragraph opinion on the propriety of
granting petitioner the requested variance. id. at 481.
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More specifically, the involvement of the Attorney General's office
has created some serious conflicts of interest which may jeopardize
the viability of the entire program. There are many examples, and
the following, both hypothetical and real, are but a few:
1. Respondent polluter and Attorney General, acting on behalf of EPA, agree
to a settlement proposal, calling on respondent to pay a nominal penalty, and install
barely adequate control devices within an extended period of time. The proposal is
submitted to the Board, and is correctly rejected. Respondent appeals, and the
Board has to be represented in the appellate court by the Attorney General, who has
already gone on record supporting the settlement proposal. 7 1
2. Petitioner seeks variance to discharge heated water into receiving stream.
Under the law, the EPA is required to file its recommendation on the request before
the Board, 7 2 and based upon its in-house technical evaluation, the EPA would
recommend that the variance be granted. But the issue has political overtones.
The Attorney General, for political reasons, has taken a militant anti-pollution stand
and, in order to be consistent, he refuses to represent the EPA. If the theory of
independent powers and prerogatives is correct, the prosecutor can ignore the
advice of the technicians.
3. The Attorney General, as attorney for the complainant (EPA) represents a
client (EPA) before another client (the Board), whom he must also represent if
an appeal should be taken from the Board's decision. A clear conflict of interest
has arisen.
4. EPA prepares a case against a major polluter, turns it over to Attorney
General's office for prosecution. Attorney General refuses to file, due to sensitivity
of subject, issue, or some other political or personal consideration; not to mention
delays involved in the actual presentation of cases which all agree should be filed.
The present ineffective manner in which enforcement is carried out
is the result of a political arrangement, and was certainly not envi-
sioned by the Environmental Protection Act. The statute empow-
ered the EPA to prosecute its own cases before the Board, while
recognizing that the Attorney General's office could initiate its own
lawsuits, either before the Board or in court. Furthermore, the Act
authorized the Attorney General to "represent" the Board on appeal;
to collect fines assessed by the Board; and to seek injunctive relief
71. This situation arose in Packaging Corp. of America v. EPA, # 71-352, 72-10,
5 PCB 91, 137 (Order-August 8, 1972; Opinion-August 15, 1972). A settlement
proposal submitted to the Board by the Office of the Attorney General was so
thoroughly inadequate that it was summarily rejected. The Attorney General then
issued a statement indicating that the Board had turned down the "E.P.A.'s" offer,
deploring the inability of the Board to finally resolve the pollution involved, and
stating that he would immediately transfer the case to a local circuit court for
relief. See also EPA v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., # 71-381, 5 PCB 93 (August
8, 1972); EPA v. City of Silvis, # 71-157, 2 PCB 677 (October 18, 1971).
72. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111Y, § 1037 (1970).
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where an emergency created the need for immediate action. 73  The
Attorney General insisted upon, and was ultimately granted the right
to prosecute all cases for the EPA before the Board notwithstanding
the fact that the Attorney General's office lacked the technical or
engineering skill to adequately handle such cases. 74
Since the Environmental Protection Agency is established within
the executive branch of state government and is really an arm of the
Governor's office, relinquishment of some of its powers and respon-
sibilities by political agreement to the Attorney General's office not
only defeats the purpose of the Environmental Protection Act, but
also deprives the Governor of an important area of his authority.
It is, therefore, vital for the Governor to reassert the authority of the
EPA to prosecute cases before the Board.
A healthy spirit of competition was both intended and achieved
when, under the terms of the Environmental Protection Act, both the
EPA and the Attorney General were given the authority to prosecute
pollution cases; the former before the Board, the latter both before
the Board and in court. In addition, the more governmental entities
which are authorized to prosecute polluters, the more likely it is that
effective prosecution will be achieved. That has all changed now,
and, in my view, the environment has suffered for it, as has the integ-
rity of the Governor of Illinois and his authority to combat pollu-
tion. Since the problem is essentially a political one which would
exist regardless of the personalities involved, it is one which requires
a political solution.
B. PLANNING AND COORDINATION
All three pollution agencies must work closely together. They
must share information and expertise, and must avoid working at
cross purposes if the program is to succeed. Therefore, compatibility
of the directors of all three agencies is vital. The Chairman of the
Board serves at the pleasure of the Governor, while the directors
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, §§ 1042, 1043 (1970).
74. The Attorney General's penchant for settlement of pollution cases without
litigation created additional tensions between his office, the EPA and the Board.
One may surmise that the EPA chose not to refer many cases to the Attorney Gen-
eral's office for fear that, either they would never be prosecuted, or that they
would be dismissed with a weak settlement agreement designed principally for political
or public relations purposes.
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of the EPA and Institute serve fixed terms.75 Clearly, all three
agency heads should serve at the Governor's pleasure, in order to
assure that compatibility among such offices continues in the event
the administration changes.
In addition, no single agency, or representative of the Governor,
has the final responsibility to assure coordination, planning, or eval-
uation of the activities of the three agencies. Thus, the agencies
could conceivably be working in the same or different areas, for con-
flicting or similar purposes, at the same or different time. A strong
state environmental planning office is, therefore, absolutely essential.
Since there are three agencies, having separate but related respon-
sibilities, the danger exists that no one agency, person, or entity is
ultimately responsible for the cohesive development and the proper
performance of the state's pollution control program. The public,
too, is often confused as to which agency or person is responsible for
stopping the buck. An environmental planning office, as referred
to above, answerable directly to the Governor, may be the answer.
In addition to the obvious benefits to be derived from the creation
of a supervisory agency, which would assure uniformity and com-
patibility in the operation of all the pollution agencies, such a body
might also fill a vital gap in the present program: statewide land-use
planning jurisdiction and authority. While the Illinois Environmental
Protection Act has supposedly created a "unified, statewide" pollu-
tion program, and while regional planning agencies with mostly advi-
sory authority exist throughout Illinois, no single or central body has
the final say in determining land-use planning questions as they af-
fect our environmental quality.76
The problems thus created are clear. At this time, no agency has
the power to halt construction of an airport, or a road, or a baseball
park, merely because it is going to be constructed in the wrong place,
and would be better situated someplace else. The Pollution Control
Board cannot halt construction of a tollway extension through farm-
lands on the ground that cars will use the road and cause air pollu-
tion, because to that extent all roads indirectly cause air pollution,
75. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/, §§ 1004(a), 1005(a), 1006 (1970).
76. In Farmers Opposed to Extension of the Illinois Tollway v. Illinois State Toll
Highway Authority, # 71-159, 2 PCB 461 (September 16, 1971), the Board noted
that its jurisdiction did not extend to questions of land use or land use planning.
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because no pollution can be shown prior to construction, and because
the same pollution will exist no matter where the road is put.77
A land-use planning agency, from which a permit to construct any
project which has the potential of degrading our environment must
first be obtained, would solve this problem. The planning agency
would determine whether the project is being planned for the right
place in terms of a uniform, statewide (not regional) master plan of
development. The pollution control agencies would oversee the proj-
ect, after it has been completed, and would verify that it is, in fact,
not damaging the environment. The planning agency, like the pol-
lution agencies, must have the teeth to enforce its directives and
development plans, and must not be relegated to the role of an advi-
sory body whose programs may be ignored with impunity.
C. ENVIRONMENTAL OMBUDSMAN
As previously noted, one of the unique features of Illinois' Envi-
ronmental Protection Act is its emphasis on public participation and
involvement. Citizens are authorized under the Act to file and pros-
ecute complaints against polluters on their own, with or without the
assistance or involvement of the Agency, the Attorney General, or
any other entity. This right may be exercised free of charge, as there
are no filing fees, and no requirement that they pay the respondent's
costs should they fail to sustain the burden of proof. The catch is
that they must bear the burden of proof; they must be able to prepare
and present sufficient evidence to the Board to convince it to impose
orders or penalties against the respondent. In regulatory matters,
private citizens submitting a petition signed by 200 persons, can re-
quire the Board to conduct hearings,' 8 but it will be somewhat more
difficult to amass sufficient technical materials to prevail in view of
the often tremendous opposition raised by industries that may be
affected by the new rules. And in enforcement cases, although a
private citizen may file the case, he will often be confronted by a
battery of company lawyers, technicians, and experts. Practically
speaking, it is difficult for a private citizen to win a meaningful pol-
lution case before the Board, unless he: (1) is supported by an
organization; or (2) is merely charging a violation which does not
77. Id.
78. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 , § 1028 (1970).
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require extensive investigation or proof, such as the failure by re-
spondent to obtain a permit; or (3) alleges failure to file a program
plan with the state as required by the regulations.
One solution would be the creation, by the state, of an office of
the Environmental Ombudsman, or even an environmental "legal-
aid" program."9 Such a program would be unique in the nation,
and would afford Illinois residents a readily accessible and visible
vehicle to use in order to become more actively involved in the state's
efforts to clean up the environment. The office would be staffed by
environmental lawyers and technicians whose only function would be
to advise and assist the public in the prosecution of their pollution
suits, free of charge. Citizens could still approach the EPA with
their informal complaints. The Attorney General could still handle
their referrals and be effective when immediate injunctive relief is
required. The office of the Environmental Ombudsman would be
available also and it, unlike the EPA or the Attorney General, would
have absolutely no function to perform other than assisting citizens
in the prosecution of pollution enforcement cases, or in the presen-
tation and support of proposed pollution regulations or standards
requested by the public.
Ideally this office would be created within the executive branch;
staff members would be appointed strictly on the basis of merit and
the director would be an appointee of the Governor, serving at the
pleasure of the Governor, but removable for cause only after a pub-
lic hearing.
D. PESTICIDES
Regulation of the use and application of pesticides in Illinois comes
under the jurisdiction of an entity known as the Inter-Agency Pesti-
cide Council. This is a gap in the authority of the Pollution Control
Board as wide as the land-use planning gap. As concern over the
use and application of pesticides, insecticides, herbicides, and fungi-
cides grows, so too should our efforts to ensure that our anti-pollu-
79. An "Environmental Lawyers Clinic" was established in Chicago on March 19,
1973. The Clinic is composed of volunteer attorneys contributing their services
part-time and free of charge to citizens wishing to file anti-pollution suits. It is
unfunded, and is in no way related to any governmental or quasi-governmental
entity.
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tion agencies have the requisite authority and jurisdiction to regulate
in the area.
VI. CONCLUSION
Illinois' efforts to develop and implement an effective environ-
mental protection program have yielded excellent and measurable
results.80 Problems and frustrations have existed, as they must in
every monumental social movement. What has emerged, now that
the formative years have passed, is a state which has made the req-
uisite commitment to improve its environment and has established
the necessary legal and administrative foundation to do the job. Illi-
nois has embarked on a vigorous enforcement campaign to rectify
the environmental damage already done and to minimize the danger
to our future.
80. Most, if not all, of the credit for Illinois' success in establishing an environ-
mental protection program which has won nation-wide acclaim, is due to the prin-
cipal draftsman of the Environmental Protection Act and the first chairman of the
Illinois Pollution Control Board, David P. Currie. Prof. Currie's brilliance, integrity,
imagination, creativity and aloofness from the political and public relations arenas
enabled the state's program to function smoothly and efficiently during its first few
years.
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